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In the heartland of Somalia, the warring parties are still playing the game of life. Innocent Somali men, women, and children are enduring the brutality of war, with thousands of innocent lives caught in daily cross-fire between the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and their Transitional Federal Government (TFG) supporters on one side, and on the other side, the Al-Shabaab organization. For over twenty years, Somalia has been the wasteland of North Africa. Peacekeepers from AMISOM, the United Nations, the European Union, Non-Government Organizations, Humanitarian Organizations, and the United States have all tried to provide stability in the country, yet, little progress has resulted. Millions of dollars have been spent, infrastructure has been built, forces have been trained, and politicians have beat the halls of capital buildings looking for international support, yet, how can we know if the Somali people are safer.
Little research has been done in measuring results in this area because it's common sense to assume the worst. The worst is simply that Somalis are not any safer today than in the past. This paper examines the progress that has been made in Somalia, using both qualitative and quantitative data, as the basis for providing an independent assessment of whether the TFG and their allies have been able to develop some control of Somalia or whether millions in resources and thousands of lives have been an expensive waste for the international community. Little research has been done in measuring results in this area because it's common sense to assume the worst. The worst is simply that Somalis are not any safer today than in the past. In this research paper, I will examine the progress that has been made in Somalia, using both qualitative and quantitative data, as the basis for providing an independent assessment of whether the TFG and their allies have been able to develop some control of Somalia or whether millions in resources and thousands of lives have been an expensive waste for the international community.
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CURRENT SITUATION
In Perhaps it was an oversight or intentional of AMISOM to not specifically state that it would protect the civilian population, but all indications are that this oversight has not created the conditions for a safe Somalia. In the following section, I will use data from the National
Counter-Terrorism Center to make an assessment whether AMISOM and the UN have created the conditions to protect the civilian population.
MEASURING THE YEARS OF CONFLICT (2010-2011)
Any research paper can be shaped to confirm any researchers hypothesis, depending on the data, that a researcher gathers, but in this case, collecting accurate casualty numbers in Somalia can be very difficult. As the report entitled, "Civilian Harm in Somalia: Creating an Appropriate
Response," stated, it is difficult to account for civilian casualty numbers in Somalia due to the lack of reporting by warning parties, lack of independent verifying NGOs or organizations, and disregard of accountability by all sides of innocent civilians caught in the cross-fire. 8 Methodologies for developing a research project on insurgent groups are often too analytical, using statistics and impressive formulas, as the basis to draw conclusions. This paper will depend on basic raw reporting figures to ensure user-friendliness and encourage applicability for future studies. 9 The National Counter-Terrorism Center has been reporting on "terrorism" incidents In any insurgency, the government has the responsibility of creating a safe environment for the population; otherwise, the population starts to doubt the ability of their government and will side with the insurgent group. 10 Al-Shabaab's use of guerilla tactics, IEDs, targeted assassinations, and brutal beheadings has created doubt in many Somalis. Using the NCTC data, if the numbers of attacks/incidents have not significantly lowered over the last two years, we can assess that Al-Shabaab's influence and control continues despite the resources and technology, advice, and training being given to the TFG and AMISOM. Finally, this assessment does not suggest that this is the only means to measure the performance of AMISOM, but it does provide a trend that can be used to draw policy recommendations and conclusions.
Finally, several additional caveats are in order here. The assessment does not suggest a typology applicable to all military structures. Additionally, there is no way that the NCTC could have captured all the attacks or incidents occurring during the time period of this study, so drawing conclusions need to be tailored accordingly.
Attack Incidents -Strategic Viewpoint and Is there Improvement?
African Union and UN reporting suggests that Al-Shabaab's influence has decreased in many parts of Somalia and they are on the retreat. Although it's antidotal, examining the raw incident numbers would be helpful in determining whether AMISOM and the TFG have made security improvements. Figure 1  11 provides us a quick-look of where and how many incidents are occurring. In the 2010 study 12 , the most dangerous locations were in the provinces of Banaadir, An educated person may ask who and why are so many civilians dying in a conflict that has two clear sides. This is a conflict that experts say has had more suffering by the civilian population than both Afghanistan and Iraq combined. The 2012 Human Watch Report states that both sides of this conflict are at fault 18 , despite the fact that both the UN and Muslim clergy have repeatedly told both sides to stop killing civilians. But, as many analysts have stated, the more civilians that are killed, the more it discredits both the TFG and AMISOM. Figure 3 clearly shows that civilian deaths far exceed any other category of While similar to other regions of the world, Islamic extremists have been identified as being responsible for civilian deaths; Somalia is no exception. As indicted in the graph 99% of all incidents have been initiated or involved Al-Shabaab. It is doubtful that AMISOM or the TFG would be considered a perpetrator of incidents, even, when responding to Al-Shabaab initiated attack. However, the main point of this perpetrator-initiated graph is to illustrate that Al-Shabaab seems to be unhindered and continues to be a threat to the civilian population. Finally, to help get a better understanding of the areas where incidents are occurring, the next section will expand on the analysis completed earlier in the paper.
Geo-Spatial View -Where are the incidents occurring?
For the last five years, AMISOM and TFG forces have concentrated all of their operations in the capital and southern Somalia. But, has this thwarted incidents and stopped the violence in this area? According to a geo-spatial intelligence view of the incident locations, nothing has changed. In figure 5 , this overlay clearly shows that attacks are still being conducted in southern Somalia. In spite of the majority of AMISOM being concentrated in Mogadishu, these overlays illustrate that the majority of incidents and deaths are still concentrated in these areas. Using both qualitative and quantitative data, as the basis for providing an independent assessment of whether the TFG and their allies have been able to develop some control of Somalia or whether millions in resources and thousands of lives have been an expensive waste for the international community, I believe it's evident that the security of Somali has not improved since I last conducted a similar study in 2010. Even UN and AMISOM quarterly reports point to the lawlessness and need for the additional resources in Somalia. The international community continues to be solicited for resources by the African Union, the United Nations, and the numerous non-governmental organizations operating in Somalia.
Not to take anything away from the wonderful heavy lifting that the brave officers and soldiers of AMISOM are conducting, but, strategically, AMISOM has been a failure.
Researchers will tell you that using statistics is only one way of measuring mission failure or success, but in this depressed world-wide economy, donor countries deserve to know if their resources are contributing to a more positive Somalia. Over the next few months, the TFG will be held accountable to provide for free elections and better governance. Hopefully, improved political conditions will result in a safer Somalia.
